Escort jamming is a core mission in airborne electronic warfare. As new tactics and higher levels of connectivity emerge, its complexity is increasing.
Mission concept
At first glance, escort jamming appears straightforward: it involves transmitting jamming signals to opposing ground and airborne surveillance and fire-control/ground-controlled interception (FC/GCI) radars to protect friendly aircraft operating in contested airspace. Opposing radars act as the eyes of an integrated air defense system (IADS), protecting an area of airspace. These radars are networked with deployed surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). The core principle of land-based air defense is layered hard-kill coverage across expanding ranges and altitudes. FC/GCI radars provide target location information to opposing controllers and connect to GCI centers. Those centers receive radar feeds from multiple sensors that protect the defended airspace. Different radar feeds are fused into a single air picture under centralized control, enabling detection, identification, tracking, and engagement by SAM, AAA, or fighter aircraft.
Electronic attack against opposing air defenses aims to suppress or destroy those radars. In addition to kinetic strikes, these threats can be degraded through electronic attack. Blinding opposing radars can be done kinetically with munitions or via electronic attack. The latter can take the form of conventional jamming, where the radar is flooded with electromagnetic noise and its performance is greatly reduced. An analogy is the static noise a driver hears on a car radio when driving under high-voltage power lines: the static can drown out the broadcast.
Alternatively, incoming radar signals can be sampled, altered, and retransmitted back to the radar in a deceptive manner. Deception techniques can make a radar believe there are more aircraft or different targets in the sky than actually exist. That deception can confuse the GCI centers, because the radar will share seemingly real but false tracks.
Jamming signals can also carry malicious code. Modern radars use digital systems and software to generate and interpret signals and to control operation. Malicious code could be delivered via communications antennas and, potentially, into radar systems themselves. Because radars are often networked, such code could propagate across the communication links that connect radars and GCI. It could also infect networked SAM batteries and AAA systems, as well as command-and-control software used to coordinate operations. As with deception, opposing air defenders might not immediately realize their systems are compromised.
Contemporary and near-future escort jammers may combine these tactics while protecting other friendly aircraft. The term escort jamming refers to jamming that accompanies a package of aircraft operating in contested airspace. This differs from self-protection, which primarily protects a single platform. Escort jamming requires specialized equipment, typically carried in a jamming pod. Pods must accommodate electrical systems that generate large amounts of jamming power to protect a wider area of friendly aircraft. Self-protection pods do not need equivalent power because the protected area around a single aircraft is much smaller. Some escort jamming pods use a small propeller-driven ram-air turbine mounted at the pod nose. The turbine spins at high speed in flight to produce required electrical power without drawing power from the host aircraft engines, which could otherwise reduce power available to other aircraft systems.
Escort jammers typically provide jamming from outside the opposing radar detection range in the hope the jammer-carrying aircraft will not be detected. Protecting the jammer is critical because loss of these aircraft removes escort jamming coverage.
Radar main lobe and sidelobes
To understand escort jammer mission mechanics, we need to discuss radar main lobes and sidelobes. A radar antenna pattern has a main lobe and several sidelobes that fan out above, below, and to the sides of the main beam. The main lobe is the strongest portion of the signal and is the beam the radar directs to detect and track targets. Approximately 80% of a radar's transmitted power is contained in the main lobe. Because this is where most of the radar power goes, a jammer needs significant power to interfere with the main lobe.
Sidelobes fan out to the sides and rear of the main beam. A jammer can exploit sidelobes to inject jamming or malicious code into a radar because sidelobes are weaker than the main lobe and therefore easier to overpower from a given angle.
When a jamming signal reaches a radar antenna, the jammer's signal strength must exceed the radar signal strength at the antenna. Signal strength is measured in decibels (dB). Consider a hypothetical, unlikely scenario for illustration: the opposing force operates an outdated FuMG-62D Wurzburg FC/GCI radar, widely used by the German air force in World War II. Friendly forces plan to use an ITT/L3 Harris AN/ALQ-99 airborne jamming pod carried by a fighter to jam that radar. Both systems have publicly available signal strength data. Assume the radar transmits at 560 MHz and the ALQ-99 can detect and attack that band. The jammer-carrying aircraft is 30 km from the radar main lobe. The radar transmits 7 kW and the AN/ALQ-99 transmits 6.8 kW of jamming power. Jammer effectiveness depends on more than transmitted power; antenna gains for the radar and jammer, atmospheric conditions, and other factors also matter. In this example, the jammer reduces the radar's effective detection range so it cannot detect targets beyond 14 km.
Ideally, the jammer-carrying aircraft would remain outside the radar's maximum range while ensuring the radar cannot detect other friendly aircraft operating closer to the radar. In the example, if the jammer is 32 km from the radar and friendly aircraft operate within 20 km of the radar, the jammer's signal could still reduce the radar's detection range to about 14.5 km, allowing the friendly aircraft to operate inside the original radar detection envelope without being detected because of the jamming. A safer tactic for the jammer is to attack the radar via its sidelobes, where signal strength is lower and targets cannot be detected at the same range as in the main lobe.
Dedicated platforms and historical context
Some nations operate dedicated electronic warfare (EW) aircraft for detection, identification, and jamming of radars. The first such dedicated aircraft appeared in World War II. The Royal Air Force formed a dedicated electronic warfare unit, No. 100 Group, to support bomber operations over Europe. It used specially modified light, medium, and heavy bombers equipped with electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM). ESM detected adversary airborne and ground radars, air-to-ground and ground-to-air radio communications, and radio navigation systems. Onboard ECM then flooded those emitters with electromagnetic noise. Ground-based ECM similarly provided wide-area support.
The concept of dedicated EW aircraft supporting strike packages evolved further during the Cold War, notably during US operations in Vietnam from 1965 to 1975. The US Navy began "Iron Hand" missions in 1965, using aircraft armed with anti-radiation missiles such as AGM-45 Shrike variants. Iron Hand aircraft sought and destroyed radar-guided SAM and AAA sites. Radar warning receivers (RWR) alerted pilots to nearby hostile radars, and anti-radiation missiles were launched to target the emitters. A similar US Air Force mission, known as "Wild Weasel," began the same year and continues in modern forms. The USAF's current Wild Weasel capability uses F-16CJs equipped with AGM-88 HARM variants and associated HARM targeting systems (HTS) that search for hostile radar emissions and employ HARM to destroy the emitters.
In the foreground of one widely circulated photo, a US Navy E/A-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft carries an AN/ALQ-99 jamming pod on a wing station; the AN/ALQ-99 is being replaced by next-generation jammers (NGJ). The US Navy introduced the EA-6B Prowler with AN/ALQ-99 and AGM-88 capability in 1971; it was replaced by the E/A-18G Growler in 2009. The Growler initially deployed AN/ALQ-99 pods while NGJ variants were developed. Raytheon's AN/ALQ-249 NGJ-Mid is fielded and covers roughly 2-6 GHz. A low-band NGJ covering about 500 MHz to 2 GHz is pending contract awards. Reports indicate the Navy is seeking to extend AN/ALQ-249 to higher frequencies, up to around 18 GHz, rather than fielding a separate high-band pod.
European NATO partners are acquiring escort jamming capabilities as well. Germany is procuring an electronic-warfare variant of the Eurofighter Typhoon to replace older Panavia Tornado ECR suppression/destroy aircraft. That Typhoon-EW will be equipped with escort jamming pods; specific pod choices were not finalized at the time of a recent conference. Potential suppliers include Elettronica, Hensoldt (Kal?tron), Indra (ALQ-8222P), Israel Aerospace Industries (EL/L-131SB Scorpius), Leonardo (Common Jamming Pod), Northrop Grumman (AN/ALQ-13), Rafael (SkyShield), and Saab (Arexis).
The European Union is also advancing an Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) program under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework. If Germany opts for pod technology developed within AEA, that would reflect continued support for European defense industry cooperation. It could also reduce reliance on US-provided technology; however, such procurements can come with restrictions on access to advanced signal processing and jamming techniques and limits on operational use of the pods. Hensoldt's involvement in AEA suggests potential direct benefits for Germany from that program.
While Germany is acquiring a dedicated EW Typhoon, escort jamming pods remain a cost-effective way to deploy strong EW capability without needing a dedicated platform. Pods can be purchased and moved between aircraft as needed. Historical procurement records indicate that average escort jamming pod costs can be substantially lower than the per-aircraft cost of a dedicated platform.
Networked effects and future trends
One of the largest expected evolutions over the coming years is the increased role of network effects in these tactics. The doctrine of multi-domain operations (MDO) is being adopted across NATO. MDO emphasizes connectivity among forces, sensors, weapons, platforms, and capabilities to enable synchronized action across domains. The goal is to share information rapidly to improve the quality and speed of wartime decision-making. High-quality, fast decisions are considered essential to defeat an adversary in future conflicts.
Future escort jamming capabilities are expected to include deeper connectivity between EW systems, enabling new operational modes. In practice this could mean real-time sharing of detailed signal-level data between jammers and ESM systems across multiple platforms, enabling geolocation and rapid threat assessment.
Networking these assets can enable faster and more accurate responses to emerging radar threats and provide detailed information about hostile emitters that moves at the speed of light among friendly EW assets. An envisioned capability is CEMA (cyber and electromagnetic activities) detection and defeat of enemy air defenses. The process begins when ESM on one or more fighters detects RF activity. That information is immediately shared with other friendly assets via secure cloud-enabled strike coordination. An escort jammer near the threatened aircraft can act as a "force protection control center," receiving and integrating the data. AI software can recognize radar activity and intent based on past waveforms and recommend combinations of jamming and code injection as the most effective counter. The escort jammer can distribute appropriate instructions and code via the cloud to the effected fighters, whose onboard EW systems then transmit the prescribed jamming signals. This distributed use of sensors and effectors aims to compel the threat to fail or become ineffective.
Such capabilities are approaching reality. NATO has introduced a Cooperative Electronic Support Measures (CESMO) protocol, which allows participating aircraft and ships to share radar threat information over existing communications networks. CESMO helps evolve airborne EW from protecting individual or small groups of aircraft into a broader, continuous task synchronized with other air operations, reflecting the MDO trajectory for EW and air combat.
Outlook
Escort jamming technology is evolving rapidly. With increasing connectivity and networked effects, the mission will be significantly enhanced in the coming years. Operators will be able to select from a range of available systems from multiple suppliers. What once appeared to be a relatively simple task is becoming more complex as tactics, platforms, and networks advance.
